

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 05878

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MPOL, NATO
SUBJECT: LTDP FOLLOW-THROUGH: DISCUSSION WITH ASYG MUMFORD

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SUMMARY: ON JUNE 9, 1978, THE DEFAD CALLED ON ASYG MUMFORD TO EXPLORE HIS THINKING AND THE STATUS OF IS WORK ON THE LTDP FOLLOW-THROUGH. MUMFORD HAS DRAFTED A PRIVATE OFFICE MEMORANDUM (PO) FOR SYG LUNS ON INITIATING ACTION ON LTDP FOLLOW-THROUGH, ADDRESSING 3 REPORTS MANDATED AT THE MAY 1978 SUMMIT AND DPC MINISTERIAL MEETINGS: A) A DPC(PS) REPORT, ON THE BASIS OF SYG LUNS' RECOMMENDATION, ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR ENSURING EFFECTIVE FOLLOW-THROUGH, TO INCLUDE PROCEDURES AND CONSEQUENTIAL STAFFING IMPLICATIONS; B) AN EWG REPORT BY 1 AUGUST 1978, ON THE BASIS OF DSYG PETRIGNANI'S RECOMMENDATIONS, ON ADDITIONAL WORK AND OTHER ACTION REQUIRED FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LTDP PROGRAMS; AND
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C) A REPORT ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUBSIDIARY MEASURES NOT INCLUDED IN THE LTDP REPORT, E.G., LOW COST/ NO COST MEASURES. THE PO WILL ALSO ASK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSALS FOR PUTTING THE WHOLE OF NATO'S DEFENSE PLANNING ON A LONG-TERM BASIS. MUMFORD'S STAFF HAS ALSO DONE A LOT OF WORK TOWARD DESIGNATING RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDIVIDUAL PROGRAM ELEMENTS, TO INCLUDE THE NATURE OF THE

ACTION REQUIRED AND TIME SCALE. HOWEVER, HE AGREES ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE FUNCTIONAL COHERENCE OF THE NINE PROGRAM AREAS AND SEEMS TO AGREE THAT NMAS ARE BEST PLACED AND QUALIFIED TO PROVIDE AN OVERALL VIEW ON MOST PROGRAM AREAS. HE CAUTIONED AGAINST: A) INCLUDING IN THE SAME PAPER THE NON-CONTROVERSIAL DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION ON INDIVIDUAL PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND POSSIBLY CONTROVERSIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROCEDURES AND PROGRAM MONITORS LEST PROTRACTED DEBATE ON THE LATTER PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR POSTPONING ACTION ON PROGRAM ELEMENTS; AND B) DEROGATING THE AUTHORITY OF CURRENT PROCEDURES. THE DEFAD LEFT WITH MUMFORD A COPY OF THE INFORMAL PAPER CONTAINING PRELIMINARY US VIEWS ON FOLLOW-THROUGH (PARA 4, REFTTEL). OUR COMMENT IS IN PARAGRAPH 16. END SUMMARY.

1. ON JUNE 9, 1978, THE DEFAD CALLED ON ASYG MUMFORD TO EXPLORE HIS THINKING AND THE GENERAL STATE OF PLAY IN THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF CONCERNING LTDP FOLLOW-THROUGH. OPENING DISCUSSION, MUMFORD SAID THAT HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE GENERAL REACTION IN CAPITALS WAS A CONSIDERABLE RELUCTANCE TO CONTEMPLATE ANY CHANGES IN CURRENT NATO MACHINERY. HE NOTED SOME VERY STRONG SIGNALS FROM THE FRG, AND RECALLED APEL'S STATEMENT IN THE DPC MINISTERIAL SESSION. THIS RELUCTANCE STEMMED, MUMFORD BELIEVED, FROM SKEPTICISM THAT A GREAT DEAL COULD BE ACHIEVED

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THROUGH CREATION OF A LOT OF NEW INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY.

2. THE DEFAD REMARKED THAT THIS RELUCTANCE MIGHT STEM FROM THE ALLIES' WARINESS OF PERMITTING STRONGER ASSERTION BY NATO AUTHORITIES THAN THEY HAVE HAD TO LIVE WITH HITHERTO. MUMFORD RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD NOT STATE THE MATTER IN SUCH NEGATIVE TERMS; RELUCTANCE STEMMED MORE FROM A RECOGNITION THAT THE POWER OF NATO MACHINERY TO IMPLEMENT ACTIONS WAS VERY LIMITED. NATO MACHINERY ACTED BY PERSUASION, NOT COERCION. FURTHER, THE ALLIES HAD CONFIDENCE IN THE CURRENT NATO MACHINERY. THE DEFAD COUNTERED THAT IT WOULD BE SURPRISING IF THE CURRENT MACHINERY COULD ABSORB ALL THE NEW TASKS THAT WOULD BE THRUST UPON IT BY THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS.

3. MUMFORD SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT IN THE ABSTRACT. HE POINTED OUT THAT EXISTING NATO MACHINERY WAS VERY FLEXIBLE, AND IT WAS MORE A QUESTION OF HOW ONE PRESENTED THE NOTION OF FOLLOW-THROUGH MACHINERY. HE FELT IT WOULD BE MORE USEFUL TO TALK ABOUT ADAPTING OR STRENGTHENING EXISTING MACHINERY

THAN ABOUT NEW MACHINERY. THE REAL PROBLEM, HE FELT, WAS THE DETERMINATION OF NATIONS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF WOULD NOT RECEIVE ONE EXTRA MEMBER FOR LTDP FOLLOW-THROUGH. HE CITED THE EXAMPLE OF THE BELGIAN ATTITUDE IN THE CIVIL BUDGET COMMITTEE, AND ADDED THAT THE US TRACK RECORD ON INTERNATIONAL STAFF AUGMENTATION WAS NOT GOOD. THE DEFAD RESPONDED THAT THE SUMMIT HAD GIVEN THE SYG A STRONG MANDATE TO PROPOSE STAFF CHANGES, AND NOTED IN PARTICULAR THE STRONG STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT CARTER.

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4. ADDRESSING THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE IS, MUMFORD SAID THAT HE PROPOSED TO SEND TO SYG LUNS THAT DAY A DRAFT PRIVATE OFFICE MEMORANDUM (PO) ON FOLLOW-THROUGH ACTION ON THE LTDP. THE PURPOSE OF THE PO WAS REALLY TO INITIATE ACTION ON THE LTDP, AND WOULD COVER THREE REPORTS MANDATED AT THE MAY 1978 SUMMIT AND DPC MINISTERIAL MEETINGS: A) A REPORT BY THE DPC IN PERMANENT SESSION, ON THE BASIS OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE PREPARED BY THE SYG, ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR INSURING AN EFFECTIVE FOLLOW-THROUGH FOR THE MEASURES APPROVED UNDER THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM; B) A REPORT BY THE EWG, BY NOT LATER THAN 1 AUGUST 1978, ON THE ADDITIONAL WORK AND OTHER ACTION REQUIRED FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LTDP PROGRAMS; AND C) A REPORT ON GETTING ACTION UNDERWAY ON THE VARIOUS SUBSIDIARY MEASURES THAT WERE NOT CARRIED FORWARD IN THE

LTDP REPORT, E.G., NO COST/LOW-COST MEASURES.

5. MUMFORD SAID THAT THE SYG'S REPORT, WHICH HE HOPED WOULD SHORTLY FOLLOW THE 1 AUGUST EWG REPORT, WOULD
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ADDRESS THE OVERALL EFFORT ON FOLLOW-THROUGH, COVERING THE WHOLE RANGE OF ACTIONS REQUIRED, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR ARRANGEMENTS FOR COORDINATION AND MONITORING OF THE PROGRAMS, THE TIME-TABLE, THE QUESTION OF PERIODIC REVIEWS AND IMPLEMENTATION, AND STAFFING IMPLICATIONS. THE EWG REPORT, WHICH PETRIGNANI WOULD DRAFT, WOULD BE DESIGNED FOR THE INITIATION OF EARLY ACTION, AND WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SYG'S REPORT. MUMFORD FORESAW NO DIFFICULTY IN ALLOCATING THE VARIOUS PROGRAM ELEMENTS UNDER THE MAIN PROGRAM HEADINGS FOR ACTION TO NATIONS OR TO EXISTING NATO BODIES.

6. MUMFORD NOTED THAT THIS BREAKOUT BETWEEN THE SYG'S REPORT AND PETRIGNANI'S REPORT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE SYG'S REPORT SPELLED OUT IN PARAGRAPH 47 OF THE DPC/D(78)7(FINAL) AND THE ORAL REQUEST BY SECRETARY BROWN IN THE DPC MINISTERIAL RESTRICTED SESSION FOR AN EWG REPORT ON ADDITIONAL WORK NEEDED TO REFINE AND MAKE MORE PRECISE LTDP PROGRAMS AND TIMING IN THE LIGHT OF DPC AND SUMMIT APPROVAL. MUMFORD HAD

ALREADY HELD A MEETING WITH HIS DIVISION DIRECTORS AND HAD DRAWN UP SOME TABLES - ONE FOR EACH PROGRAM AREA - WHICH INDICATED FOR EACH PROGRAM ELEMENT WHETHER IT WAS READY FOR DIRECT IMPLEMENTATION, REQUIRED FURTHER ELABORATION, OR INVOLVED FURTHER STUDY. THE TABLE ALSO INDICATED WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM ELEMENT AND THE TIME FRAME INVOLVED.

7. AS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE TABLES WORKED, MUMFORD CITED THE RECOMMENDATION IN THE AREA OF RESERVE MOBILIZATION FOR THE US AND CANADA TO ELIMINATE DEFICIENCIES IN NUMBERS OF NAVAL RESERVISTS. THE TABLE SHOWED THIS AS A
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MID-TERM ACTION SUSCEPTIBLE TO DIRECT IMPLEMENTATION BY THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, WITH SOME POSSIBLE MONITORING BY THE EWG OR THE DRC. MUMFORD ADDED THAT HIS STUDY INDICATED ROUGHLY THAT SOME 45 PERCENT OF THE PROGRAM ELEMENTS WERE RIPE FOR IMPLEMENTATION, 30 PERCENT NEEDED

FURTHER ELABORATION, AND 25 PERCENT CALLED FOR FURTHER STUDY. HE NOTED THAT SOME 60 PERCENT OF THE PROGRAM ELEMENTS WERE FOR IMPLEMENTATION IN THE SHORT OR MEDIUM TERM, SOME 25 PERCENT FELL IN THE MEDIUM TO LONG TERM, AND ONLY 15 PERCENT WERE LONG TERM ONLY.

8. THE DEFAD POINTED OUT THE IMPORTANCE OF GIVING PROMINENCE AND AN EXTRA PUSH TO LTDP ACTIONS THAT FELL TO EXISTING BODIES. MUMFORD AGREED, SAYING THAT PETRIGNANI'S PAPER REALLY REPRESENTED A STAGE ONE, WHICH WOULD PUT NATIONS AND COMMITTEES ON NOTICE THAT ACTION WAS REQUIRED, AND THAT STAGE TWO, NOT VERY MUCH LATER, IN LUNS' PAPER, WOULD SHOW HOW ACTION WAS TO GET DONE, PUT SOME STEAM INTO ACCOMPLISHMENT, AND ADDRESS MONITORING AND PERIODIC REPORTS TO MINISTERS. THESE LATTER SUBJECTS, MUMFORD SAID, WERE PROPERLY PROVINCES OF THE SYG'S PAPER. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE PETRIGNANI'S PAPER NON-CONTROVERSIAL AND GET IT OUT ON THE STREET, SO THAT NATIONS AND NATO COMMITTEES OR BODIES COULD GET ON WITH IMPLEMENTATION, AND NOT TO TIE IMPLEMENTATION INTO A CONTROVERSIAL PAPER ADDRESSING PROCEDURES.

9. THE DEFAD SAID THAT IT WAS HEARTENING THAT NATO BODIES WERE NOT SITTING AROUND IDLY BUT WERE ACTIVELY THINKING ABOUT LTDP FOLLOW-THROUGH, AND THAT THERE WAS A CERTAIN CONGRUENCE IN THINKING TO DATE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT

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THE US WOULD AT LEAST DROP A STRONG MARKER, IN CONSIDERING PETRIGNANI'S PAPER, ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING FUNCTIONAL COHERENCE, A REQUIREMENT THAT HAD BEEN RECOGNIZED IN GROUPING THE ACTIONS INTO THE NINE PROGRAMS INITIALLY. HE REMARKED THAT THIS FUNCTIONAL COHERENCE MADE FOR GREATER LUCIDITY, AND CITED EXAMPLES OF THE AIR DEFENSE AND REINFORCEMENT AREAS. MUMFORD AGREED THAT THIS MADE SENSE.

10. THE DEFAD ASKED MUMFORD HOW HE SAW MONITORING BEING ACCOMPLISHED, POINTING OUT THAT THE LTDP WAS SUFFICIENTLY MONUMENTAL TO WARRANT CONSIDERING DEVIATIONS OR MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING PROCEDURES. WHILE IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO DEROGATE FROM THE ESTABLISHED RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DEFENSE PLANNING IN NATO, IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE SEPARATE IDENTITY OF THE LTDP. MUMFORD SAID MUCH DEPENDED UPON WHAT ONE MEANT BY MONITORING. HE SAW GREAT DANGERS IF NMAS WERE TO ASK FOR REPORTS DIRECTLY FROM NATIONS. FURTHER, HOW WOULD CONFIDENTIAL

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SACEUR, FOR EXAMPLE, RELATE TO WORK BEING DONE BY THE CNAD?

11. THE DEFAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THESE WERE SENSITIVE ISSUES, BUT THEY MUST BE FACED. HE ASKED, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS IT BEYOND CONSIDERATION THAT ON PROGRAM ELEMENTS RELATED TO CNAD WORK, SACEUR WOULD GO TO ASYG WALSH FOR INFORMATION. MUMFORD RESPONDED THAT SUCH A COURSE WAS NOT BEYOND CONSIDERATION AND THAT INDEED THE NMAS MIGHT BE THE INDIVIDUALS WHO COULD GIVE AN OVERALL VIEW OF THE PROGRAM. MUMFORD NOTED THAT SACEUR PULLS TOGETHER HIS COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS REPORTS BASED ON INFORMATION FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES -- FROM REPORTS BY THE MSC'S FROM DPQ REPLIES, ETC; AND HE COULD SEE A PERFECTLY GOOD CASE, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR SACEUR PROVIDING PERIODIC REPORTS ON AIR DEFENSE. FURTHER, THE EWG COULD ASK SACEUR TO SPECIFY WHAT INFORMATION HE NEEDED. ONE SOLUTION MIGHT BE TO LOAD UP THE DEFENSE PLANNING QUESTIONNAIRE. THE DEFAD SAID THAT WE HAD CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN LTDP ANNEX TO THE DPQ. AS MUMFORD THOUGHT ABOUT THE QUESTION, HE CONCLUDED THAT THOUGH NMAS SHOULD NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO TASK THE VARIOUS NATO COMMITTEES, IT SEEMED REASONABLE THAT THEY HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THESE COMMITTEES IN ORDER TO DEVELOP AN OVERALL VIEW IN A PARTICULAR AREA.

12. THE DEFAD THEN MADE THE CASE FOR AN ANNUAL UPDATE

OF THE LTDP PROGRAMS. MUMFORD WAS NOT CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR UPDATING, BUT OFFERED NO CASE AGAINST IT. HE DID POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT, WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROGRAM AREAS MIGHT BLUR, AND NEW AREAS COULD BE ADDED.

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13. MUMFORD SAID THAT IN PARALLEL WITH ALL THE WORK ON LTDP FOLLOW-THROUGH, HE HOPED THAT THE NOTION OF PUTTING THE WHOLE DF NATO'S DEFENSE PLANNING ON A LONG-TERM BASIS COULD BE WORKED ON, AND HE HAD PLACED A PARAGRAPH IN THE DRAFT PO FOR LUNS THAT WOULD CALL FOR SUCH WORK TO BE COMMISSIONED BY THE DPC. HE ADDED THAT HE FELT IT WOULD BE BEST TO ASK FOR APPROVAL OF THE PO UNDER THE SILENCE PROCEDURE SINCE IF NATIONS WERE TO MEET, E.G. IN THE EWG OR DPC, THEY MIGHT FEEL OBLIGED TO PUT FORTH NEGATIVE MARKERS AS HEDGES AGAINST FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS THEY MIGHT FEAR. THE DEFAD AGREED

14. IN WRAPPING UP THE DISCUSSION, THE DEFAD NOTED THAT THE RATHER CONSERVATIVE REACTION TO FOLLOW-THROUGH HE WAS SENSING IN NATO HEADQUARTERS WAS A BIT DISAPPOINTING. MUMFORD RESPONDED THAT INSTEAD OF CONSERVATIVE REACTION, IT WAS MORE A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN AT THROWING AWAY SOME VALUABLE AND DISCIPLINED PROCEDURES IN DEFENSE PLANNING WITHOUT REPLACING THEM. HE SAID THAT NO ONE WAS MORE AWARE THAN HE ON HOW PRONE COUNTRIES WERE TO TRY TO WRIGGLE OUT OF COMMITMENTS. HIS TWO CONCERNS WERE A) TO AVOID CREATING A SITUATION IN WHICH NATIONS COULD CITE A DEBATE ON PROCEDURES AS A PRETEXT FOR DOING NOTHING ON THE LTDP UNTIL THE DEBATE WAS SETTLED; AND B) TO AVOID DEROGATING THE AUTHORITY EMBODIED IN CURRENT PROCEDURES.

15. THE DEFAD LEFT WITH MUMFORD A COPY OF THE INFORMAL PAPER CONTAINING PRELIMINARY US VIEWS ON FOLLOW-THROUGH (PARA 4, REFTTEL).

16. COMMENT. WE ARE NEITHER ELATED NOR DISCOURAGED BY

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WHAT WE LEARNED OF MUMFORD'S THINKING ON LTDP FOLLOW-THROUGH. ON THE WHOLE, WE BELIEVE THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US VIEWS AND HIS. WE NOTE, IN PARTICULAR: A) HIS AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE FUNCTIONAL COHERENCE OF THE 9 PROGRAMS; AND B) HIS APPARENT ACCEPTANCE THAT THE NMAS ARE IN GENERAL BEST PLACED AND QUALIFIED TO GIVE AN OVERALL VIEW ON MOST PROGRAM AREAS, AND THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE BEYOND THE WIT OF MAN TO FIND A WAY TO MAKE SURE THEY HAVE ACCESS TO THE NECESSARY INFORMATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, HIS BASIC INSTINCTS ARE STILL CONSERVATIVE, AND WE WILL HAVE TO KEEP CLOSE TABS ON HIM. HE BELIEVES THAT HIS VIEW OF THE BREAKOUT BETWEEN LUNS' AND PETRIGNANI'S REPORTS IS BASED ON MINISTERIAL DECISIONS AND, ALSO, PERHAPS, ON SOME SORT OF INFORMAL CONSENSUS THAT EMERGED DURING PETRIGNANI'S DISCUSSIONS WITH US OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON, FOLLOWING THE SUMMIT, THAT THE EWG PAPER SHOULD BE NON-CONTROVERSIAL SO AS TO GET ACTION UNDERWAY FORTHWITH. END COMMENT. BENNETT
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